Job Tenure and Cyclical Changes in the Labor Market by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Ruhm, Christopher J
JOB TENURE AND CYCLICAL CHANGES IN THE LABOR MARKET

 
 
By: Christopher J. Ruhm 
 
Ruhm, Christopher J. “Job Tenure and Cyclical Changes in the Labor Market”, Review of  
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 69, No. 2, May, 1987, 372-78. 
 
Made available courtesy of Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press: 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/rest?cookieSet=1 
 
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
 
Abstract: 
Using data on male heads of households from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
this paper finds that although short tenure workers accounted for a disproportionate share of total 
unemployment, during the early seventies, cyclical fluctuations in joblessness were concentrated 
among persons currently holding or recently having held longer-lasting employment. Greater 
unemployment durations were a more important source of rising joblessness than increased 
separation probabilities and cyclical changes in both variables were larger for recent leavers of 
medium or long tenure employment than for persons with similar seniority in their current job. 
 
Article: 
I. Introduction 
Economists have long been interested in the distribution of cyclical changes in employment and 
unemployment. For example, Clark and Summers (1981) argue that employment fluctuations are 
disproportionately concentrated among teenagers and young women and that, contrary to some 
earlier studies (e.g., Feldstein (1973)), these groups receive substantial benefits from policies 
which increase aggregate demand.
1
 Despite the important role of job seniority in most theories, 
limited empirical evidence has been obtained on tenure group variations in cyclical labor market 
flows.
2
 
 
This paper provides information on two related questions. Section II examines how cyclical 
fluctuations in unemployment, among male heads of households, are distributed across workers 
with different employment durations. Section III decomposes the total effect into changes in job 
separation probabilities as compared to post-separation reductions in employment and evaluates 
the relative importance of each. 
 
Throughout the paper, I emphasize the distinction between seniority in the current job and tenure 
in the longest recently held position. While the former mea- sure of job duration is most 
important for theories emphasizing firm specific skills or institutional arrangements, tenure in 
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 For instance, teenagers and twenty to thirty-four year old females compose 9.2% and 15.5% of the population but 
26.7% and 23.8% of cyclical employment fluctuations (Clark and Summers, 1981, p. 69). 
2
 See Raisian (1983) and Darby et al. (1985) for research which does consider seniority. 
recent previous jobs provides information on unobserved worker characteristics and labor force 
attachment (for further discussion, see Ruhm (1986)). 
 
Information on prior job duration is especially important for evaluating several currently popular 
macro- economic explanations of employment fluctuations. For example, equilibrium business 
cycle models (Lucas and Rapping, 1969; MaCurdy, 1981) emphasize the importance of labor 
supply responses to transitory wage changes and predict that employment variations should be 
concentrated among groups with high reservation wages. To the extent that reservation wages 
change in predictable ways over the lifetime, these will be workers with weak labor force 
attachments and histories of short employment tenures. Similarly, recent dual labor market 
theories argue that secondary labor markets serve as a buffer protecting the primary sector from 
fluctuations in aggregate demand (see Piore (1979)). Secondary workers then have low average 
job tenures because of their vulnerability to cyclical slowdowns in the economy. In both models, 
cyclical employment changes will be concentrated among workers with short tenure in current 
and recently held jobs. Section II presents evidence that, at least for prime-age males, this is not 
the case. Although disproportionate shares of cyclical changes in unemployment fall upon 
persons with "short" (less than three years) current tenure, a substantial share of the employment 
change is accounted for by workers with more than three years seniority in recently held 
previous jobs. 
 
Consistent with earlier research (Hall, 1972; Marston, 1976), section III shows that turnover 
probabilities de- cline rapidly with tenure and that cyclical employment fluctuations result more 
from changes in unemployment durations than in separation probabilities. The analysis does 
reveal two surprises. First, there is no statistically significant cyclical change in either separation 
probabilities or post-separation employment reductions for per- sons with less than three years 
seniority. Second, high tenure workers find new jobs as fast or faster than their low seniority 
counterparts, in contrast to predictions of simple search models stressing the relationship 
between tenure and reservation wages. 
 
II. Labor Market Flows: Preliminary Evidence 
Analysis of labor market flows became popular in the early seventies to explain variations in 
unemployment rates across demographic groups. Early work (Hall, 1972; Feldstein, 1973) 
emphasized differences in turnover probabilities, while later research showed that short 
unemployment durations among high turnover groups result more from large propensities to 
leave the labor force, when unemployed, than from rapid reemployment (Marston, 1976; Akerlof 
and Main, 1980) and also that "long" unemployment spells account for the bulk of total weeks of 
unemployment, despite short average spell lengths (Clark and Summers, 1979). 
 
Separation rates decline with job tenure, due to acquisitions of firm specific human capital, 
seniority based layoff policies, and better employer—employee job "matches." We know less 
about the relationship between tenure and either post-separation unemployment durations or 
cyclical variations in transition probabilities, and economic theory gives few clear predictions in 
these areas. For example, increased seniority might be associated with longer unemployment 
spells, if tenure increases earnings and consequently reservation wages, or shorter joblessness if 
high tenure persons are more averse to spells of nonemployment. 
 
To shed light on these questions, I use data on three calendar years from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). The sample in this section includes male head of households aged 
twenty-five to sixty-five, during the survey year, who participated in the labor force during some 
part of that year and the two preceding it and contains approximately three thousand usable 
observations per year.
3
 To obtain cyclical patterns, I com- pare the two recession years 1971 and 
1975 to the 1973 business cycle peak.
4
 Workers are grouped as having "short" (less than three 
years), "medium" (three to nine years), or "long" (ten or more years) tenure in their current or 
most recent pre-separation employment and also in the longest job held during the previous three 
years.
5
 
 
Table 1 categorizes workers by seniority and various measures of unemployment Columns 2 and 
3 show the familiar result that unemployment becomes less probable as seniority increases. For 
instance, holders of "short" jobs are 4.7 times more likely to experience unemployment than 
those with more than ten years seniority and almost 8 times as probable to be unemployed over 
half the year. Changing jobs within the previous two years (rows 7 through 9) increase 
unemployment probabilities, but unemployment still falls 
 
                                                 
3
 Ideally, females and non-household heads would also be studied. Unfortunately, data limitations in the PSID 
prevent analysis of these groups. 
4
 The aggregate unemployment rate was 5.9% in 1971, 4.9% in 1973, and 8.5% in 1975; the corresponding sample 
unemployment rates were 3.13%, 1.82%, and 3.46%. 
5
 Calculating job tenure is complicated because the PSID reports seniority only for individuals employed at the time 
of the survey. If a worker changed jobs during the previous year, it was therefore necessary to go back one and 
sometimes two survey periods to obtain the relevant tenure information. 
with previous job duration. For example, holders of prior "long" jobs are a third less likely to 
become unemployed and almost two-thirds less probable to be unemployed over twenty-six 
weeks than workers with "short" previous employment. 
 
Columns 4 through 7 present information on changes in unemployment between the 1973 
business cycle peak and the two adjacent recessions. Considering current seniority first (rows 1 
through 3), short tenure workers are responsible for a disproportionate share of cyclical 
employment fluctuations, accounting for under a fifth of the population but 27% to 35% of the 
cyclical increases in unemployment and between 31% and 60% of cyclical changes in "long" 
(over twenty-six weeks) unemployment. Conversely, the percentages for medium and long 
tenure workers are usually smaller than their population shares. 
 
Comparing rows 1 to 3 of table 1 to the six subsequent rows illustrates that exclusive focus on 
current seniority can be misleading. Individuals whose longest recent job tenure is less than three 
years (row 4) account for none of the unemployment change occurring between 1971 and 1973 
and a fairly small percentage of that between 1973 and 1975. Conversely, long tenure recent job 
holders (row 6) experienced particularly large reductions in unemployment as the economy 
recovered in the early seventies and the medium tenure group (row 5) the greatest increases 
during the post-1973 economic deterioration. 
 
The different cyclical patterns for current versus longest recent job tenure, suggest special focus 
on workers who have changed jobs in the two years prior to the base period. These are defined as 
recent job changers and considered in rows 7 through 9 of table 1. We have already discussed the 
high unemployment probabilities for this group. Columns 4 through 7 show that recent leavers of 
"long" jobs are also responsible for large shares of cyclical fluctuations in unemployment. 
Although constituting only 3.4% of the population, they account for between 13% and 19% of 
the cyclical increases in unemployment experiences and between 9% and 43% of changes in 
"long" unemployment.
6
 Thus leavers of long jobs appear especially vulnerable to further 
separations and post-separation unemployment if economic conditions subsequently deteriorate. 
 
III. Transition Probabilities and Tenure 
This section uses a pooled sample for the years 1971 through 1975 to examine how cyclical 
employment variations are divided between changes in separation probabilities and in post-
separation employment reductions.
7
 Included are male heads of households, between the ages of 
twenty-five and sixty (in 1969), who participated in the labor force during some part of every 
year between 1969 and 1975.
8
 As above, I also separately consider persons changing jobs in the 
two years prior to the base year (hereafter referred to as "recent job changers"). The tenure 
variable for recent changers is seniority in the longest job held during the preceding three years, 
while for the full sample it is duration in the most recent preseparation job. Control 
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 In part, this could occur because short tenure job leavers are more likely to exit the labor force and so never be 
counted as unemployed. To prevent this possibility, the regression analysis of section III uses employment rather 
than unemployment as the dependent variable. 
7
 Since information on jobs held during the two years preceding the base year is utilized, data are actually obtained 
from 1969 on. 
8
 Workers excluded because of non-participation in some survey year probably have relatively short job tenures. 
Biases from this exclusion will be minimized by the stability of the adult male labor force. For instance, over 87% of 
male house-hold heads in the labor force at any time between 1%9 and 1975 participate in all seven years. 
characteristics include experience, experience squared, education, education squared and dummy 
variables for job tenure, city size, marital status, and race. 
 
Tenure is available only as a categorical variable in the early years of the PSID, requiring the use 
of dummy variables for short, medium, and long tenure, corresponding to the definitions of the 
previous section. Data for actual work experience are available in 1974, al- lowing experience to 
be calculated as 1974 experience plus the difference between the current year and 1974. Most of 
the other variables are fairly standard. Separations are defined as temporary if the individual re- 
turns to the old job within two years and permanent (voluntary or involuntary) otherwise. Weeks 
worked and reasons for changing jobs are self-reported by the survey recipient. 
 
To ascertain how job termination effects vary with seniority, I interacted the three separation and 
three tenure variables. Cyclical fluctuations were considered by interacting the various separation 
and tenure variables with the survey year unemployment rate.
9
 
 
A. Separation Probabilities 
Information on the relationship between separation probabilities and economic conditions was 
obtained from logit regressions of  
 
 
 
where SEP is a dichotomous variable taking the value one if the requisite type of separation 
occurs in year t, X the control vector of individual characteristics (including tenure), UTEN a 
vector interacting the unemployment rate with the three tenure categories, and e the error term. 
Coefficients on UTEN will be positive if worsening economic conditions increase separation 
probabilities. 
 
Table 2 presents the average and cyclical changes in separation probabilities, obtained from 
estimates of equation (1), with independent variables other than tenure evaluated at their sample 
means.
10
 Columns 1, 3, and 5 show average separation probabilities for each tenure group and 
confirm the standard result that turnover declines with tenure, especially in the first few years of 
the job. We also observe significant seniority related reductions in permanent separations among 
re- cent job changers, with corresponding increases for temporary separations. 
 
Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the impact of a one percentage point increase in unemployment above 
the sample average rate. In the full sample, economic conditions generally have weak effects on 
separation probabilities, with the only statistically significant results occurring for temporary 
separations among medium and long tenure workers and involuntary layoffs in the middle group. 
In contrast, increased unemployment often raises the turnover rates of recent job changers, 
particularly where the previous job lasted three or more years. For example, worsening economic 
conditions substantially raise probabilities of permanent separations in the middle tenure 
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 To test for potential specification bias in the pooled data, I ran unconstrained versions of the regressions below, 
where the individual control characteristics have different slopes in each of the five base years and separate year 
intercepts. The estimated coefficients for tenure, separations, unemployment, and the interactions were virtually 
unchanged and so results of these regressions are not reported. 
10
 Full results of all regressions are available upon request. 
category and temporary separations among the longest group. Conversely, we observe no 
statistically significant cyclical changes in the separation probabilities of workers with short 
previous jobs. 
 
B. Post-Separation Changes in Employment 
Separations are frequently followed by a spell of joblessness. To see how such employment 
reductions depend upon tenure and economic conditions, I estimated  
 
 
 
 
where X is the vector of control variables, TENSEP a vector of interactions between tenure and 
the three types of job separations and USEP a vector interacting the unemployment rate with 
each element in TENSEP. The dependent variable EMP measures weeks of 
 
 
 
calendar year employment.
11
 Results of the regressions are summarized in table 3. Columns 1, 3, 
and 5 show the post-separation reductions in calendar year weeks of employment at the average 
unemployment rate; columns 2, 4, and 6 give the additional impact of a one percentage point 
increase in unemployment. For example, columns 3 and 4 of row 1 indicate that permanent 
layoffs involving short tenure workers lead to an employment loss of approximately 13 weeks in 
"average" years and an additional 2 ½ weeks when the sample unemployment rate is one 
percentage point above average. 
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 Weeks of employment, rather than unemployment, are used to compensate for possible inter-group differences in 
cyclical labor force participation patterns.  
 
Separations are always associated with statistically significant declines in weeks worked. Losses 
are largest for short tenure workers, ranging from 8 to 13 weeks, as compared to 1 to 8 weeks for 
those with more seniority. Permanent layoffs lead to the greatest employment reductions, quits to 
the smallest. Tenure group differences are also present for the recent changers subsample but are 
less pronounced and typical reductions in post-separation employment are larger. 
 
Cyclical fluctuations in post-separation employment differ sharply for the full sample and for 
recent job changers. Full sample cyclical effects are small with a 1% increase in the 
unemployment rate adding less than 2 weeks of nonemployment for temporary and voluntary 
separations and 2 to 4 weeks for involuntary layoffs. Tenure group differences are relatively 
minor and without a clear pattern. Conversely, in the subsample, cyclical changes are more 
pronounced, with especially large fluctuations among the longest tenure group. For instance, a 
one percentage point increase in sample unemployment reduces employment among leavers of 
"long" current jobs by 1 to 4 weeks but by a much greater 3 ½ to 16 weeks for individuals 
experiencing a second separation after having departed a "long" job within the preceding two 
years. 
 
C. Simulation Results 
The relative importance of fluctuations in separation probabilities and in post-separation weeks 
of employment is estimated by calculating the expected percent- age change in each when the 
unemployment rate rises from 0.75 percentage points below its sample average rate of 2.72% to 
0.75 percentage points above. The resulting hypothetical peak and trough rates of 1.97% and 
3.47% are similar to the actual sample minimum and maximum of 1.82% and 3.46% which 
occurred in 1973 and 1975, respectively.
12
 
 
The simulation findings are presented in table 4 and can be summarized as follows. First, 
variability in post- separation employment explains a greater share of cyclical employment 
fluctuations than changes in separation probabilities. Second, cyclical variations in both variables 
increase with current job tenure. For instance, long tenure workers are 11 times more likely to 
separate 
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 Low unemployment rates result from restricting the sample to adult male household heads. 
 
 
from jobs in hypothetical recession years than peak periods and if they do separate will be out of 
work twice as long. For short tenure workers, the corresponding cyclical changes are only around 
20%. Third, cyclical fluctuations are generally larger for recent job changers than for the full 
sample. Again the differences increase with tenure with particularly large changes for the most 
senior category. This verifies evidence in section II, indicating that recent changers of long jobs 
account for disproportionate shares of cyclical employment fluctuations. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper confirms earlier research showing an in- verse relationship between job duration and 
turnover rates. Low tenure workers account for a disproportionate share of total unemployment, 
both because they are more likely to terminate jobs than their more senior counterparts and 
because separations lead to greater reductions in employment. 
 
Although responsible for a relatively small share of total unemployment, workers with 
substantial tenure in recently held jobs constitute a much larger proportion of cyclical 
fluctuations in employment and unemployment. Persons with short current job tenure who have 
recently held longer jobs appear unusually vulnerable to deteriorating economic conditions. For 
most groups, fluctuations in post-separation weeks of employment, rather than changes in 
separation probabilities, are the primary factor explaining cyclical changes in employment. 
 
This paper's results are qualified by limitations in the sample and time period examined, 
nonetheless, several tentative conclusions emerge. Although low tenure male heads of 
households may well by "stuck" in inherently unstable jobs, there is little evidence that this 
instability is especially acute during economic downturns. Instead, recent leavers of longer jobs 
become relatively more vulnerable in recessions. Traditionally, the welfare losses of these 
workers have been minimized by unemployment compensation—including extended benefits 
during periods of high unemployment. Recent changes in eligibility standards have eliminated 
much of this protection. For example, Burtless (1983) has shown that less than half of 
unemployed workers received benefits during the 1982 recession. To the extent that a major 
burden of economic downturns rests upon persons recently departing "long" jobs, extended 
unemployment benefits and targeted retraining programs may be justified to mitigate these 
losses.
13
 Before redesigning existing programs, a sounder theoretical basis is required. 
 
One interesting possibility is suggested by recent work considering the role of recessions in 
redistributing labor across sectors of the economy.
14
 Since high tenure workers are relatively 
immune from transitory demand shocks, we might expect short tenure workers to bear the brunt 
of temporary fluctuations in demand. Large scale cutbacks and plant closures occurring during 
recessions would then impact workers higher up on seniority ladders, increasing their share of 
unemployment. This effect will be strengthened if recessions are "unbalanced," hitting declining 
sectors especially hard. Persons leaving high tenure jobs in good economic periods would be 
vulnerable to subsequent separations during recessions, if employment had been obtained in 
declining industries. Subsequent job displacement would then result in significant unemployment 
as work in the declining sector becomes increasingly scarce. 
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